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IMPOSITION
RICHARD DELGADO*
JEAN STEFANCIC**
I. INTRODUCTION
In Merrztt v. Faulkner,' the Seventh Circuit rejected a plea
brought by a prisoner who already had filed a number of other
claims. Describing him and other prison writ-writers as petty
and litigious,2 the court went on to declare their refusal to come
to terms with their own guilt and their constant hounding of the
authorities as yet further proof of their unregenerate condition.'
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, Umversity of Colorado. J.D., Boalt
Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 1974.
** Research Associate, University of Colorado School of Law. M.L.S., Simmons
College, 1963; M.A., University of San Francisco, 1989.
We gratefully acknowledge the efforts of our research assistants Devona Futch,
Bonnie Kae Grover, and Karl Stith, who labored long and hard in Colorado to sup-
ply us with faxes, footnotes, and memos. We also thank the Rockefeller Foundation
and its staff at the Villa Serbellom in Bellagio, Italy, where this Article was written.
We delivered an earlier version of this paper at a Bellagio Scholars-m-Residence
Colloquium in June 1993, and we thank those present for their contributions and
suggestions.
1. 823 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the district court properly rejected
an inmate's challenge to the validity of a settlement agreement in Is civil rights ac-
tion against prison officials).
2. Id. at 1157 (Posner, J., concurring) ("Inmates love turning the tables on the
prison's staff by hauling it into court. They like the occasional vacation from prison
to testify m court."); see also McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1323 (7th Cir.
1982) (Posner, J., dissenting) (recording his "amazement" at the large number of
prison suits).
3. Merritt, 823 F.2d at 1157 (Posner, J., concurring); see also McKeever, 689 F.2d
at 1323 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("[Ilnstead of reflecting on the wrongs they have
done to society our convicts prosecute an endless series of mostly imaginary
grievances against society "); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F Supp. 1204, 1347
(E.D.N.C. 1987) ("Instead of spending a significant amount of her time at work
initiating grievances without merit, and filing baseless charges of discrimination,
perhaps plaintiff would have been better off to remember that the greatest deterrent
to racism is excellence in performance. Unfortunately, this was a lesson plaintiff
never learned or, if learned, was long ago forgotten."), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Blue v. United States, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1580 (1991).
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Courts, including the Supreme Court, lately have been em-
ploying more and more such expressions of exasperation in cases
brought by prisoners, minorities, and other outsider groups.4
Our thesis is that the court system, like society generally, de-
ploys terms of imposition at key moments in the history of a re-
form effort, such as blacks' struggle for equal opportunity,
women's campaign for reproductive rights, or the effort of the
institutionalized to win humane conditions of confinement.5
Before reaching that point, society tolerates or even supports
the new movement. We march, link arms, and sing with the
newcomers, identifying with their struggle.' At some point, how-
ever, reaction sets in. We decide the group has gone far enough.
At first, justice seemed to be on their side. But now we see them
as imposing, taking the offensive, asking for concessions they do
not deserve. Now they are the aggressors, and we the victims.
At precisely this point in a reform's history, we begin to de-
ploy what we call "imposition language"--language of encroach-
ment.7 We decide the group is asking for "special" status. We
find their demands excessive, tiresome, or frightemng. The im-
position narrative delegitimizes the reform movement, portray-
ing it as unprincipled. But by a neat switch, it also enables us to
feel comfortable about withdrawing our support; the imposition
paints us as morally entitled to oppose the movement and bring
it to a halt.
Part II of this Article explains how narratives guide percep-
tion, become ingrained, and enable us to construct and under-
4. Examples of such cases are discussed infra part II. See also Richard Delgado
& Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1061 (1994) (discussing the Su-
preme Court's use of satire and caustic language directed at disempowered groups).
For a habeas corpus case also brusquely dismissing a prisoner's suit, see Gomez v.
United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992).
5. See infra part V.B. (addressing the special situation of black Americans, and
arguing that this group is subject to a double axis of forces).
6. On triumphalism and the cheerful optimism of many liberals with respect to
black progress, see, for example, Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tra-
dition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986);
Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be
Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987)).
7. Viz, you have taken advantage and gone too far. For an analysis of the van-
ous subnarratives that constitute the idea of imposition, see infra part V.A.
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stand the world. Part III focuses more closely on the narrative of
imposition, illustrating its role and function from a number of
periods and sources, including Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Part IV explains how and why the imposition mechanism works.
Part V summarizes the argument, situates the imposition strate-
gy within a general framework by which society resists social
change, and concludes by offering our thoughts on ways in which
reformers may deflect or counter the narrative when it is ar-
rayed against them.
II. THE NARRATIVE MOVEMENT AND THE LAW
Recent scholarship has focused on the role of stones and nar-
ratives in guiding perception and determining legal outcomes.8
Writers such as Derrick Bell,9 Man Matsuda,'0 and Charles
Lawrence 1' have analyzed stones about racial justice; Thomas
Ross, 2  Kathryn Abrams, 3  Tom Massaro,'4  and Randall
8. See ON NARRATIVE (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981); 1 & 2 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME
AND NARRATIVE (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer trans., 1984-85); JAMES B.
WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985);
JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); Richard Delgado,
Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1872 (1990); Symposium, Legal Storytell-
ing, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (containing articles by Derrick Bell, Milner Ball,
Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, and others).
9. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTroM OF THE WELL. THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992)
[hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL]; Derrick Bell, Foreword: The
Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985).
10. See, e.g., Man J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Public Response
to Racist Speech]; Man J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Conscious-
ness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989).
11. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Rac-
ist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 [hereinafter Lawrence, If He Hollers Let
Him Go]; Charles R. Lawrence, I, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholar-
ship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV.
297 (1990) [hereinafter Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action]; Thomas Ross, The
Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race]; Thomas Ross,
The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381 (1989) [hereinafter Ross, The
Richmond Narratives].
13. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971
1994] IMPOSITION 1027
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Kennedy 5 have analyzed stones dealing with inequality in gen-
eral. Much of the new work draws upon cognitive psychology,
sennotics, literary criticism, and post-structural thought in an
effort to understand the relationship among text, meamng, cul-
ture, and change.
One of the new scholarship's central tenets is that if one
wants to understand how law works, one must do more than
analyze its manifest content-the terms, precedential value, and
logical cogency of the texts themselves. Rather, one must also
understand how statutes and case law interact with the setting
and background against which they are issued and read. 6
Many authors show how stones become internalized, after which
they efficiently and invisibly determine what we see.. In particu-
lar, stones about outsider groups impede their progress by por-
traying them as undeserving and unworthy of support. Thus, for
example, Thomas Ross has analyzed the Supreme Court narra-
tive of poverty and immorality and the innocent white; 7 Der-
nck Bell, the "tipping point";8 Charles Lawrence, redressable
racism as bounded and dichotomous; 9 and Angela Harms, the
narrative of the unitary essential woman in fenumst thought."
(1991).
14. See, e.g., Tom M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law:
New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 6; Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Le-
gal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989).
16. On the need to move beyond formalist analysis, see, for example, MILNER S.
BALL, LYiNG DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985) (suggesting a
new conceptual metaphor for law: a medium for human solidarity); BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 9, at 3-10; Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay
on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813 (1992) (proposing an examination of the legal
background against wich the familiar interpretive work of courts and legislatures
takes place); Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 11, at 437, 476-81;
Ross, The Richmond Narratives, supra note 12.
17. Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, supra note 12; Thomas Ross, The
Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991)
[hereinafter Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty]; Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race,
supra note 12.
18. E.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 9, at 140-61 (relating the
"Chromcle of the DeVine Gift" to illustrate the unspoken limit on affirmative action).
19. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (proposing a new test to
trigger judicial recognition of race-based behavior).
20. Angela P Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
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Although much of their work has dealt with the reception of
new or critical scholarly ideas, some narrative scholars go be-
yond that. They point out that majoritarans tell stones too,
indeed, that law can be seen as a collection of tales and stock
stones.21 This "counterstorytelling" approach examines major-
itaran stones in order to understand their structure and func-
tion, especially in relation to social justice.22
This Article, which focuses on the imposition narrative, draws
on both approaches. We trace the development of imposition
language, give examples from different periods, and show the
part it plays in crystallizing opposition to social reform. We show
how early stages of a reform movement often elicit sympathy
Our self-image is that of a tolerant and welcoming people. But
eventually the new movement gains momentum. It turns out
that it wants to do more than march, talk, sing, and pray; it
wants to redistribute wealth and influence. Around this point,
rhetoric shifts. We portray the reformers in less flattering terms.
Now they are illegitimate and opportuistic. We are the victims.
They are imposing on us.
III. THE NARRATIVE OF IMPOSITION
In this Section, we set out a series of ways in which main-
stream writers, including Justices of the Supreme Court, have
written about reformers. Common to each is the idea that the
reformer is the one who is overstepping, is abusing his or her
welcome, or is going too far.
We first consider words that focus on the reformer personally,
or on some trait or quality that renders him unreasonable, a
nuisance. We then focus on words that impugn the outsider's
motives, then ones that focus on his or her external actions. A
fourth category focuses on the implications or effects of reformist
L. REV. 581 (1990) (arguing that gender essentialism fails to challenge the laws
tendency to privilege the abstract and unitary voice).
21. E.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionzsts and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado, Storytelling for Oppo-
sitionists and Others]; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357
(1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle]; Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech, supra note 10.
22. E.g., Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others, supra note 21.
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behavior. In general, society attaches the imposition label only
to individuals or groups whom we have already constituted as
bearers of a stigma.23 We rarely hold our friends guilty of impo-
sition; at most they are guilty of momentary lapses. Only outsid-
ers, persons whom we have already rendered "other," exhibit
behavior we can deem to be an imposition.
A. Words That Impugn the Outsider Personally
Sometimes courts and others deem an individual guilty of
imposing by virtue of who he or she is-that is, simply by being
a Jew, woman, Chinese, or black, engaged in some ordinary
activity of life. These examples were somewhat more common
early in our history than they are now "4 But they have not en-
tirely died out; one hears overtones of the essentialist approach
even today, fifty years after we abandoned the pseudoscientific
theories of human differences that gave rise to it.
25
1. Examples from Court Opinins
Four cases dealing with racial minorities or women illustrate
the imposition per se approach. In the Dred Scott decision,26
the United States Supreme Court considered for the first time a
direct challenge to the institution of slavery Writing for the
majority, Justice Taney reviewed the history of Negro slavery
beginmng with early colonial times, concluding that blacks al-
ways had been regarded as property 27 The early colonial lead-
ers and Framers of the Constitution were "great men," who re-
23. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258 (1992) (describing how stigmatic imagery of various outgroups strains
conventional First Amendment doctrine). On stigma in general, see ERVING
GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1974); IRVING
KATZ, STIGMA: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1981) (discussing the societal
response to stigmatized groups).
24. See generally STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981) (providing
an account of this period).
25. Id. at 28.
26. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
27. Id. at 407 ("He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of
merchandise ").
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garded the institution of private property, including the owner-
ship of slaves, as the basis of civilized government.2" Conse-
quently, Justice Taney found it "impossible to believe that these
rights and privileges [of citizenship] were intended to be" ex-
tended to slaves." His opimon showed little contrition, sorrow,
or inner tension, in effect chastising the petitioner for having
asked the Court to do something absurd on the face of it, given
his status as a Negro."0
In Bradwell v. Illinois,3 Myra Bradwell sought admission to
the Illinois bar, which rejected her application. The United
States Supreme Court agreed that a woman's desire to practice
law did not constitute a privilege of citizenship protected by the
Constitution." If permitted to practice law, women might want
to "engage in any and every profession, occupation, or employ-
ment"33 -something the Court obviously considered outlandish.
Justice Bradley, in his concurrence, used words of imposition to
describe how unreasonable Myra Bradwell was in making her
request: "[i]n the nature of things it is not every citizen that
is qualified for every calling and position." 4 Evidently the Su-
preme Court found Ms. Bradwell, who had already performed an
28. See id. at 410 (describing the Framers as "great men-high in literary acquire-
ments-high in their sense of honor"); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (" 'tlit is a constitution we are expounding.' ") (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819)).
29. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 412.
30. Id. at 410 (arguing that the Framers knew full citizenship "would not in any
part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the Negro race"); id. at 407 (ex-
plaining that Negroes' exclusion from citizenship "was regarded as an axiom in mor-
als" at the time the Constitution was adopted); id. at 405 (describing the Court's
duty "to interpret the instrument according to its true intent and meaning
when it was adopted").
For a more recent variation on this black-hence-overreaching approach, see Har-
ris v. Marsh, 679 F Supp. 1204, 1221 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (admonishing that race dis-
crimmation charges are very serious, "because if proved, [they] carry an enormously
stigmatizing effect," and so "should only be leveled after careful investigation [and]
thoughtful deliberation"), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Blue v. United States,
914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991).
31. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
32. Id. at 138-39.
33. Id. at 140 (Bradley, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 142.
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apprenticeship and passed a written examination,"5 unqualified
by virtue of her womanhood, and peculiar for wishing to follow a
course more characteristic of "the sterner sex."8
In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,3" the Supreme Court
upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act limiting immigration to the
United States from that country Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Field pointed out that Chinese immigration had increased
rapidly because of the Gold Rush in the middle of the century 
38
Many of the Chinese settlers were hardworking and frugal,
which led to friction between them and their white neighbors.39
They struck others as clannish and aloof, holding to their own
customs, language, and norms even in their new land.4" A con-
vention to consider the problem found that the Chinese were a
"menace to our civilization" and had a "baneful effect on the
material interests of the state."'" Emphasizing these supposed
traits, Justice Field upheld the statute. Every sovereign nation
must have jurisdiction over its own borders, he reasoned; other-
wise, other groups would have power to determine its destiny 42
Control over immigration is necessary for "security against for-
eign aggression and encroachment"43 and from "vast hordes
of people crowding in upon us."" These dangers are espe-
cially acute when the foreigners are of a "different race"" not
likely to "assimilate with our people."" The imposition lan-
guage could not be plainer. The characterization of the Chinese
as undesirables who do not deserve to be here could not be more
manifest.
35. Id. at 130 (majority opinion).
36. See id. at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring).
37. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
38. Id. at 594-95.
39. Id. at 595.
40. Id. at 592-96.
41. Id. at 595.
42. Id. at 603-04.
43. Id. at 606.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 595. Nor was this early hyperbole or one-time-only error. Seventy years
later the Court spoke of Japanese-Americans in much the same terms. See
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96-97 (1942) (referring to persons of Jap-
anese descent as nationalistic, cloistered, and reluctant to assimilate).
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More recently, in Maher v. Roe,47 the United States Supreme
Court considered a challenge to a Connecticut funding program
that paid fully for the cost of an indigent woman's childbirth,
but did not fund abortions that were not medically necessary
The Court held that Connecticut's program did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, even though an earlier decision, Roe v.
Wade,48 had found abortion to be a fundamental right.49 Be-
cause Connecticut did not create the petitioner's indigence, it
had no obligation to make her abortion free or affordable. 0 Her
poverty, in other words, gave her no special standing.51 The
Court saw no difference between what Ms. Roe was demanding
and a hundred other possible clains an indigent woman might
make for welfare support.52 It noted that she failed to see
something that was "abundantly clear"-that seeking aid for a
choice other than "normal childbirth" constituted serious over-
stepping.53 The Court stopped just short of telling her she did
not understand her role as a poor woman-namely, to be as
qmet, prudent, and nondemanding as possible.5 4 Although not
as blatant a case of exclusion as the previous examples, Maher's
effect is just as serious: women who cannot afford abortions will
not be able to obtain them. The opimon's indignation over the
woman's effrontery is practically as plain as that of the mne-
teenth century cases.
47. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. Maher, 432 U.S. at 470-71.
50. Id. at 474 (recognizing that indigency makes it difficult or impossible to have
an abortion, yet maintaining that the Connecticut regulation places no obstacle in an
indigent woman's path that was not already there).
51. See id. at 470-71 (underscoring that "ain indigent woman desiring an abortion
does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes").
52. See td. at 471.
53. Id. at 477.
54. See id. at 471 ("in a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a
wealth classification But this Court has never held that financial need alone
identifies a suspect class for purpose of equal protection analysis."); zd. ("Nor does
the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a
different conclusion."); id. at 479 ("We certainly are not unsympathetic 'but the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.' ")
(quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
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2. General Popular Discourse
Although the Supreme Court today uses imposition per se
language less frequently than prior Courts, certain social com-
mentators have no such inhibition. For example, in a recent
issue of The New Republic, Mickey Kaus penned a scathing re-
view entitled The Godmother- What's Wrong with Marian Wright
Edelman."5 For Kaus, Ms. Edelman's book on the plight of poor
children avoids the root cause of the problem, namely, their
parents' dependency and unwillingness to work."6 Edelman's
interpretation thus constitutes a kind of double hubris. Her cli-
ents overstepped in the first place by being poor and making us
feel guilty And she overstepped as author by blaming society for
neglecting its schools and children. Kaus further charged
Edelman with opportunism, implying that she wrote as she did
in order to increase funding for her organization. 7
Linda Chavez, writing in the same magazine, seems to ridi-
cule in the title of her article, Just Say Latino, Hispamc groups
who insist on calling themselves "Latino.""5 How tiresome--yet
another new name, yet another imposition on our good natures!
Her article also describes the call for affirmative action pro-
grams for Hispanics in Washington, D C. as amounting to quo-
tas, 9 and the group's troubles as its own fault for refusing to
legalize and assimilate into the culture as previous immigrants
have done. ° There is little to indicate that Chavez wrote as she
did to exhort her countrymen to do better. She describes their
traits in fatalistic terms, as though they are inborn and unlikely
55. Mickey Kaus, The Godmother: What's Wrong with Marian Wright Edelman,
NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 15, 1993, at 21 (reviewing MARIAN W EDELMAN, THE MEASURE
OF OUR SUCCESS: A LETTER TO MY CHILDREN AND YOURS (1992)).
56. Id. at 22, 24.
57. Id. at 25.
58. Linda Chavez, Just Say Latino, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 22, 1993, at 18.
59. Id. Other writers also find quotas lurking in proposals that contain no men-
tion of them. See, e.g., Chester E. Finn, Jr., Quotas and the Bush Administration,
COMMENTARY, Nov. 1991, at 17, 21 (finding quotas in the proposed civil rights legis-
lation of both political parties); Clinton's Nominee Gets the Bork Treatment, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., May 24, 1993, at 3 (reporting that law review articles of Justice De-
partment nominee Lai Guinier were seen as quota measures, and that some de-
scribed her as a "quota queen" who advocated a "racial spoils system").
60. Chavez, supra note 58, at 18.
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to change.6 The English-only movement supplies further exam-
ples of inherent imposition. Supporters speak of immigrants who
wish to maintain their culture with an irritation that sometimes
verges on revulsion. They are unpatriotic and unfit to reside
here, their presence (in their unreformed foreign language
speaking condition) calculated only to precipitate "white
flight."62 Certain Latino and Asian groups' insistence on speak-
ing their own language with each other merits special scorn."
In an iromc twist, Asians who succeed can also draw unfavor-
able attention. Recently, a United States Representative met
with leaders of two Asian groups to make amends for what he
was forced to admit were "poorly chosen words" related to Asian
American students who win scholarships.' Speaking to the
Maryland congressional delegation, Republican congressman
Roscoe G. Bartlett noted that of recently awarded scholarly priz-
es, "half went to those with Oriental names, a sixth to Indi-
an names, and the rest to what we would consider normal Amer-
icans."65 Bartlett later explained that he meant "normal" only
in the sense of average, that he did not mean to offend anyone,
and that the news media had taken liberties66-- thereby com-
pleting a nearly perfect triple-trope. The Asian schoolchildren
overstepped by being here in the first place--note the use of the
61. See id. ("Given these realities"--the group's illegality, rapid growth rate, and
poor education-an affirmative action program to redress Hispamc underemployment
in D.C. "is a little absurd."); td. ("In its fixation on quotas, the commission simply
ignores the enormous problem of illegal immigration
62. See, e.g., Juan Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Lan-
guages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992) (ana-
lyzing antibilingualism rhetoric); Abigail M. Thermstron, Bilingual Miseducation,
CoMIENTARY, Feb. 1990, at 44 (asserting that bilingualism entrenches difference and
weakens consensus); Bilingualism, ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 32 (implying that
the backers of the bicultural movement are unpatriotic and that an influx of non-
English speaking immigrants will cause whites to leave).
63. E.g., Michelle Maglalang, A Day to Remember What It Means to Be American,
DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), July 5, 1993, at 2C (describing the practice as "tear-
ing through our common fiber," sending a "terrible" signal, "losing the meaning of
what it means to be American," and unpatriotic); Bilingualism, supra note 62.
64. Ways and Means, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 17, 1993, at A23.
65. Id.
66. Id. Bartlett complained that reporters had distorted his remarks and that he
had meant no offense. Consequently, he declined to apologize, standing by the senti-
ment of what he was trying to say. Id.
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slightly derogatory term "Oriental." Next, the Asian students
had the effrontery to apply themselves at school, thereby impos-
ing on the prerogative of the native-born to take things easy and
still get good grades-witness the use of the word "normal" to
imply that the Asian children were strange. Finally, the media
overstepped by reporting the congressman's remarks, thereby
invading his prerogative to put the foreigners in their place
without drawing attention.
B. Words That Impugn the Outsider's Motives
Imposition language also can cast reformers or an outsider
group in a negative light because of their supposed bad motives
or unstated agenda. The outsider is not looking for social justice,
but spoiling for a fight, with a chip on his or her shoulder. Or
the outsider has an impernssible motive-advancing social
claims to win funding, acclaim, or power he or she does not de-
serve.
1. Supreme Court Opinions
A line of recent cases, including the ones mentioned at the
beginmng of this Article,"7 illustrates the first approach. Courts
have been rejecting prisoners' writs brusquely, sometimes imply-
ing that prisoners write them because they are bored and have
too much time on their hands.6 8 Sometimes, judges imply bad
character in other ways, as well. A plurality opimon of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor in City of Rzchmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,69
in addition to other reservations, warned of the danger of acced-
ing to "a politics of racial hostility "" In doing so she implied
that the backers of the Richmond program, which would have
increased the number of minority contractors, were themselves
racially hostile and were prepared to be unfair to innocent
67. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Harris v. Marsh, 679 F Supp. 1204, 1347 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (castigat-
ing a plaintiff for initiating "baseless charges of discrimination" and for failing to
learn her lesson), affd in part, rev'd in part sub. nom Blue v. United States, 914
F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991).
69. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
70. Id. at 493.
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whites.' The opimon echoed earlier Supreme Court cases that
also viewed black demands as hypersensitivity In the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883,2 the Court struck down a federal civil
rights statute under which black plaintiffs had brought suit,
finding that Congress lacked the power to enact it. 3 Although
the grounds for invalidation were technical and narrow,"4 the
Court went on to chide the plaintiffs for bringing the suit in the
first place, observing that what they seemed to want was not
equal but special treatment."5 The cases all concerned access to
public accommodations, such as inns and public conveyances,"6
yet to the Court, the demands seemed like a request for special
aid. It was time for African Americans to stop insisting on such
treatment and to become "mere. citizen[s]."" A few years later
in Plessy v. Ferguson,"8 the Court again scolded blacks, this
time for wanting to ride in the same railroad car as whites."9
The Court failed to see the insult in the railroad company's rule,
declaring that any injury lay in the plaintiffs' nunds and in the
interpretation they placed on their treatment.0
2. General Popular Discourse
Colummsts and reviewers have been even less reticent about
attributing base motives to reformers than has the Court. Re-
call, for example, the article mentioned earlier that depicted a
well-known advocate for children's rights as concerned mainly
with her own funding.8 Similarly, detractors criticized Repre-
71. See td. at 495-501 (claiming that the City of Richmond was the one using dis-
tasteful racial categories and tactics sure to backfire by granting benefits to black
contractors); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 218-19 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (implying that blacks who have suffered no wrongs often
sue to "get even" for mjures suffered by their forebears long ago).
72. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
73. Id. at 25.
74. See id. at 10-17.
75. Id. at 25.
76. See id. at 4-5.
77. Id. at 25.
78. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
79. Id. at 550-52.
80. Id. at 551.
81. See Kaus, supra note 55; supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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sentative Maxine Waters for her role in the wake of the Los
Angeles disturbances in 1992 following the verdict in the first
trial of police officers accused of beating Rodney King. Waters
had spoken to reporters about the causes of the riots, namely,
black poverty and the unresponsiveness of the city's bureaucra-
cy 12 Her accusers charged her with cynically exploiting the
tragedy and attempting to thrust herself into a limelight she
had not deserved or won.83
Another writer, in an article on the English-only movement,
described activists working with immigrants and bilingual
teachers as disrespectful of the majority culture, seemingly only
because they were respectful of the immigrants' culture.' In a
note on street hassling, 5 the editors of The New Republic ridi-
culed a theory pioneered in a Harvard Law Review article which
urged that women who are subjected to leers, whistles, and un-
wanted remarks on the streets should have legal recourse."
The note suggested that those who support this movement are
petty and vindictive, that being hassled is "a hazard of exis-
tence," and that the author is advocating a violation of the con-
stitutional rights of men."7
82. See, e.g., Douglas P Shuit, Waters Focuses Her Rage at System, L.A. TIMES,
May 10, 1992, at Al (describing the focus of Representative Waters' public expres-
sions of anger after the riots as "the years of indifference by the political power
structure, the unshakable poverty of the inner city, and a federal government that
seems more concerned with putting Eastern Europe back on its feet than with
America's blighted cities").
83. Midge Decter, How the Rioters Won, COMMENTARY, July 1992, at 17, 18-19
(implying that Waters basked in the limelight and posed as an expert and comment-
ing that "never again would she have quite so good a time").
84. James Traub, Back to Basic: P.C. v. English, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 8, 1993, at
18. Other writers find insult to white institutions in a wide range of advocacy or
conduct. See, e.g., Ken Hamblin, Some See Only Evil in Our Legal System, DENVER
POST, June 30, 1992, at 7B (discussing insult in Hispanic dress customs); John Leo,
Honesty About Race Is Gaining New Ground, DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), Apr.
14, 1992, at 5A (discussing insult in the general mmdset that supports minorities at
the majority's expense); Howard Pankratz, Judge's Speech to Be Reviewed for Bias,
DENVER POST, Apr. 14, 1993, at 1A (discussing the insult in a judge's pro-feminst
speech).
85. Notebook, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 8.
86. Cynthia G. Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettomzation of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993).
87. Notebook, supra note 85, at 8; see also Talking Dirty, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 4,
1991, at 7-8 (argmng that some aspects of sexual harassment are a constitutional
1038
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C. Words That Find Imposition in Particular Forms of Behavior
In a third variant, the speaker does not impeach reformers or
their motives, but rather their actions. These accusations tend to
be less harsh than the first kind. Nevertheless, they hold that
the reformer is doing something wrong-either demanding some-
thing that by its very nature constitutes imposition, or going
about things the wrong way, e.g., by trying to vault to the head
of the line.
1. Legal and Supreme Court Discourse
Civil rights measures for blacks invariably strike some com-
mentators as troublesome. For example, the Civil Rights Act of
1964,88 enacted in the wake of John F Kennedy's assassination
and Martin Luther King's marches in Southern cities, today is
regarded as a moderate mainstay of legal protection for minon-
ties. When it was proposed, however, Senator Barry Goldwater
and Alabama Governor George Wallace argued that it nght
take the creation of a police state to enforce the measure.89 In
Regents of the Unversity of Californza v. Bakke,"0 the umversi-
ty instituted a program that gave minorities certain priorities in
admission to medical school.9' In striking down the program,
Justice Powell highlighted the way in which the program, al-
though aimed at increasing diversity, nevertheless operated un-
fairly against "innocent persons in respondent's position."92 The
right). For a collection of quotations and poll results on white males' fear of swamp-
ing by women and minorities, see David Gates, White Male Paranoia, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 48.
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1988).
89. See DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST Su-
PREME COURT 30 (1992); see also CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LON-
GEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 143 (1985)
(reporting that Senator Strom Thurmond filibustered a record 24 hours, 18 minutes
to delay deliberations on the 1957 Civil Rights Bill); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An
Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1005, 1019 (1992) (reporting that Senator Thurmond opposed an earlier
bill, the 1957 Civil Rights Act, on the ground that it would amount to "an enslave-
ment of white people").
90. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
91. Id. at 274-76.
92. Id. at 298.
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"innocent whites" concern has been appearing more and more
frequently in judicial opinions rejecting black demands. The
judge, for example, notices that a complicated job program in-
creases the number of jobs for blacks but decreases or holds con-
stant those for whites. He or she fixates on the latter, finds a
causal connection, and holds that no program of racial justice
can come at the expense of nonrmnorities not personally respon-
sible for the African Americans' predicament. 3
For example, in two recent decisions, cities had enacted pro-
grams under which minority firefighters or teachers who ranked
below whites in job security or eligibility for promotion could
sometimes be treated more favorably than if they were white. 4
Focusing largely on this .aspect of the programs, the Court
struck them down as containing an impermissible "leapfrog-
gng" remedy " All job and promotion criteria, of course, en-
able some to advance while others do not-that is their function.
That the Court saw this scheme as impermissible seems to rest
on a premise that minorities should not expect or attempt to
advance rapidly, and certainly not at the expense of whites.
In McCleskey v. Kemp,97 a Georgia death penalty case, the
Court highlighted the potentially unlimited scope of the remedy
93. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 500 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (holding that the Court may not grant relief "to those
who were not victims at the expense of innocent nonminority workers injured by
racial preferences"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)
(Powell, J.) ("[Als the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work
against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and overexpansive.");
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 530 n.12 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (com-
menting that it would be an oversimplification to assume that all those seeking to
take advantage of minority set asides "currently suffer from the effects of past or
present discrimination"); see also Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, supra note
12 (arguing that the racially-loaded "rhetoric of innocence" should be put aside);
Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race, supra note 12, at 9-12 (discussing the rhetori-
cal facade the author believes permeates the Supreme Court's race decisions).
94. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986) (firefighters); Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (teachers).
95. The term is Justice White's. See Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters,
478 U.S. at 534-35 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing Firefighters Local Umon No.
1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984)).
96. Id., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-85.
97. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
the challengers had requested." If the legal system accepted
the idea that statistical disparities in jury outcomes along racial
lines warranted relief in death penalty cases, things might not
stop there. Challengers might be able to show physical attrac-
tiveness, race, or sex-based disparities in other types of sentenc-
ing as well, placing the integrity of our entire jury system in
question.9 The Court displayed some thinly veiled exasperation
with McCleskey and the attorneys who had brought the case,
describing McCleskey's earlier motion for a new trial as "ex-
traordinary,"100 calling the study upon which the case was
based "clearly insufficient,"'0 ' and referring to McClesky's ar-
guments as "wide-ranging." °2
2. General Public Discourse
Nonlegal writers also see many forms of behavior and advoca-
cy as encroachment. For example, some conservative writers de-
scribe gays and lesbians as pushing themselves into the main-
stream, or pressing their sexuality upon the rest of us.103 The
physical images evoked are striking, if unconscious-the efforts
of gay activists to resist discrimination are seen as a kind of
aggression, verging on rape. Writers advocating immigration
restraints use similar, if less colorful, language. The illegal alien
98. Id. at 315-18.
99. Id. at 315-17.
100. Id. at 285.
101. Id. at 297.
102. Id. at 319. An expanding body of lower court decisions have imposed Rule 11
sanctions on civil rights and other plaintiffs for bringing suits the judge finds frivo-
lous or bizarre. See Witzsche v. Jaeger & Haines, Inc., 707 F Supp. 407, 408, 412
(W.D. Ark. 1989) (stating that "the court has noted with some alarm that it
sees more frivolous Title VII cases than any other type By this opinion, the
court serves notice "); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 4, at 1082-85 (discussing
other such cases).
103. E.g., John Leo, We Need Not Endorse Everything We Tolerate, DAILY CAMERA
(Boulder, Colo.), Aug. 10, 1992, at 7A; Adam Nagourney, Homophiliac, NEW REPUB-
Lic, Jan. 4 & 11, 1993, at 16 (discussing the actions of gay activists in the Clinton
campaign and Administration); see also Medical Correctness, NAT'L REV., Mar. 15,
1993, at 19, 19-20 (suggesting that reports concerning the spread of AIDS have been
exaggerated by "special-interest groups," including homosexual activists, to insure re-
sources were committed to this "disease associated mainly with homosexuality and
drugs").
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is said to sneak into the United States, insinuate himself into
our midst, hide, remain without asking permission.1 14 The in-
trojection language, language of overstepping, is both literal and
unmistakable.
Finally, feminists seeking to regulate hardcore pornography
and civil rights activists attempting to control hate speech often
evoke charges of censorship.' ° Commentators ranging from
moderate liberals to archconservatives often focus exclusively on
the restraint of speech, overlooking the equally serious harms to
equality and dignity the reformers are trying to redress.' The
reformers' behavior is judged according to the one standard
alone-that of freedom of speech-and found wanting.
104. See, e.g., Peter Brimelow, Time to Rethink Immigration?, NAVL REV. June 22,
1992, at 30 (commenting on the adverse history of immigration in the United States
and the need to change the country's image as an immigrant nation); The Immz-
grants, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 19, 1993, at 7 (discussing the latest wave of Arab im-
migrants and their supposed connection with the World Trade Center bombing).
105. See, e.g., Ken Emerson, Only Correct, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 18
(discussing the University of Wisconsin's code of student conduct which prohibited
various forms of hate speech and how similar codes, at nearly 125 other schools,
have been characterized as "gag rules on free speech"); George Will, "Compassion" on
Campus, NEWSWEEK, May 31, 1993, at 66 (discussing the "thought vigilantes" on
America's college campuses); see also DINESH D'SOuzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE
POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 140-56 (1991) (discussing and criticizing cam-
pus speech codes); Edward Alexander, Race Fever, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1990, at 45
(claiming that "freelance vigilantes are m a state of high alert for signs (real or
alleged) of 'racism' " at America's umversities); Richard Bernstein, The Rising Hege-
mony of the Politically Correct, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1990, § 4, at 1 (discussing the
increasing pressure to conform to politically correct ideas on umversity campuses);
Robert Lerner & Stanley Rothman, Newspeak, Feminist-Style, COMMENTARY, Apr.
1990, at 54 (discussing the efforts of feminists to influence the content and selection
of textbooks in elementary and secondary schools); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Ra-
cial Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 562 (arguing that
increasing speech is more effective in combatting racism than is the censorship of
racist speech).
106. We have in mind the kind of response that begins, "Now, in this free speech
issue " On the way in which the campus-speech controversy implicates two nar-
ratives, free speech and equal protection, each of which could with equal justification
be deemed central, see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991).
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D. Impositin Through Effects or Implications
A final approach portrays a reform movement as threatening
encroachment through its effects or symbolic impact.
1. Supreme Court Opinins
Courts seem to employ the reductio ad absurdum and the
"where would you draw the line?" arguments in law reform cases
more than anywhere else. As we shall describe later, these ap-
proaches also can be used when we do not want to take the
reformers' request seriously, but are merely entertaining or toy-
ing with it. But at other times we deploy these arguments with
a vengeance-when we have decided to confront the reformers'
demands squarely and reject them.
For example, in Harrs v. McRae,0 7 the Supreme Court rdi-
culed the plaintiffs effort to establish a state's obligation to pay
for abortion services.' If such an obligation were recognized,
the Court reasoned, why would things have to stop there?' 9
The next case might request that the state pay to send
someone's child to a private school."0 In language reminiscent
of Bradwell v. Illinozs,"' the Court described the plaintiffs de-
sired result as "extraordinary "1
2
In another case, a Florida school board's policy protected mi-
nority teachers in the event of layoff.' In Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Educatin, the Supreme Court struck down the policy,
reserving especially scathing treatment for the teacher-as-role-
model argument."4 Although the lower courts had held that
"the Board's interest in providing minority role models for its
107. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
108. Id. at 316-18.
109. Id. at 318.
110. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
111. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's decision m Bradwell to uphold the Illinois bar's rejection of
an applicant on the basis of her gender).
112. Harrs, 448 U.S. at 318; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 499, 498 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) (claiming that a remedy for an "amorphous"
and "ill-defined [racial] wrong" could go on forever).
113. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1986).
114. Id. at 274-76.
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minority students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of soci-
etal discrimination, sufficiently important to justify the ra-
cial classification,"15 the Court spurned the argument."' It
would justify anything, could require discriminatory hiring prac-
tices to be maintained longer than is remedially necessary, and
might even end up limiting the number of African American
teachers in districts that had few black students."7 That these
dangers were theoretical, almost farfetched, did not seem to
trouble the Court. The role model argument threatened to re-
structure classrooms, a sensitive area. By its very nature that
seemed to usher in imposition.
2. The Figure zn General Public Discourse
Popular writers have wielded the "drawing the line" or "where
will it all stop?" arguments with frequency and fervor almost
equal to those of courts. Dinesh D'Souza, for example, both in
his book Illiberal Educatzon and in a number of articles, warned
that giving in to the demands of campus radicals eventually
could spell the end of the university as we know it." 8 He de-
picted minority students' demands for meeting places, theme
houses, and dormitories as steps toward Balkanization of the
campus and the politicization of university life."' For D'Souza
this first wave of requests was not so much dangerous in itself
as for what it portended: a university in which knowledge is not
unitary, but shifting and contestable, a community that contains
not one voice but many 120
115. Id. at 274.
116. Id. at 275-76.
117. Id. At least one other Justice expressed similar concerns in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing
that finding an individual has a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy
"would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching").
118. D'SOUZA, supra note 105, at 1-2; Dinesh D'Souza, The New Segregation on
Campus, COMMENTARY, Winter 1991, at 22.
119. See D'SOUZA, supra note 105, at 46-51.
120. See id. at 46-51, 55-68, 82-93, 112-15, 157-67, 184-90, 230-42. The settings in
which columnists or others have perceived potential "floodgates" or where-will-it-end
problems are almost unlimited. See, e.g., Stacey Baca, Jeffco Board Urged to Save
"Redskins", DENVER POST, May 7, 1993, at 1B (sports mascots); Beef Exec Says
"Food Nazis" Just Want to Feel Superior, DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), Jan. 29,
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Shelby Steele also draws attention to the ramifications of
multiculturalism, but has added a new element-the dangers
that the movement holds for blacks. 2' According to Steele, Af-
rican American college students who seek special courses, pro-
fessors, and departments will end up marginalizing themselves,
and will fail to acquire the types of knowledge and competence
that really matter.'22 Everyone will regard their degrees as
second rate, while the rest of the university will feel it has dis-
charged its obligation to the newcomers.'23 Steele warns of a
kind of self-imposition in which black leaders demand changes
the rest of the black community does not want or need.'24
Mainstream columnists writing about gay rights also raise the
where-will-it-all-end specter, sometimes going on to supply their
own answer: "truculent tribalism."'25 One writer likens gay ac-
tivists to "guerillas moving down from the hills to attack the cit-
ies.' '126 Another warns that giving in to one group increases the
chances that "other(s) will emerge demanding that their
preferences or orientations receive similar treatment. If the bar-
rer against homosexuality falls, there will be no other that
can stand Men have forgotten God."27
1993, at 4B (food regulation); Tom Garvin, Is Nobody Happy?, DENVER POST, Apr.
25, 1993, at 7B (team names); John McCarron, Enough Already with Victim Groups,
DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), Jan. 26, 1993, at 2D (new minorities in general);
Todd Wilkinson, Earth First? No Way, Says "Wise Use", DENVER POST, June 28,
1992, at 1A (environmentalists).
121. See generally SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER (1990) (pro-
viding a general critique of multiculturalism and affirmative action on campus).
122. See id. at 21-35, 111-25, 127-48, 173; Shelby Steele, White Guilt, COMMENTARY,
Autumn 1990, at 497, 497-99.
123. See STEELE, supra note 121, at 90, 111, 116, 127-48, 173 (arguing that affir-
mative action and special courses deflate the value of black students' degrees and
allow the umversity to avoid the hard work of providing them a real education).
124. See id. at 111-25.
125. John Leo, Attack on White Males Starting to Get Ugly, DAILY CAMERA
(Boulder, Colo.), Apr. 22, 1993, at 3B.
126. Id.
127. Cal Thomas, After Gay Rights, What?, DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), Apr. 27,
1993, at 7B; see also Virgnma Culver, Armstrong: Gays "A Grave Threat", DENVER
POST, Mar. 20, 1992, at 1A (quoting a former U.S. Senator who called gay activism
a "grave threat" and described sympathizers as "tragically misguided" since embrac-
ing the cause of gays could weaken support for "legitimate mnnority groups
who've struggled to achieve true civil rights in America"). Echoes of tis line of rea-
soning appear, as well, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (observing
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IV THE NARRATIVE'S EFFICACY AND ATTRACTION
The previous Section showed that the imposition narrative
can be categorized in terms of its target. Another way of looking
at it is in terms of the underlying themes and stones it taps and
from which it draws its efficacy As we have seen, the narrative
of imposition appears at predictable periods in history, namely
when reform has gained momentum and appears poised to pro-
duce changes that make us uneasy When so deployed, it seems
to have real bite. What accounts for its persistence and power'?
In this Section, we look at imposition in two ways. We examine
its subtexts and component parts. Then, we examine its mai-
fest content to see what makes it so plausible.
A. Efficacy and the Role of Subnarratives
Our research disclosed a veritable landscape of imposition
types, corresponding to a series of basic, almost innate, sub-
narratives, ranging from "who are you, anyway?" to "nobody
talks about me anymore." Perhaps the most basic subnarrative
of all is that of the bully Everyone recalls childhood games and
activities in which one of the opponents did not play fair-relied
on force, broke the rules, or insisted on special treatment. In
adult life, things are almost never so simple. Most reformers are
not seeking to break the rules but to change the game entirely
We still carry images, however, from these early experiences and
apply them to situations where they may or may not fit.
that laws against sodomy are aimed at reinforcing morality, a legitimate social objec-
tive, and that "if all [such] laws are to be invalidated the courts will be
very busy indeed").
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1. Baselines and Tipping Poznts-"The Way Things Are"
Recently a colummst complained that all recent books seemed
to be about women.' In actuality, the writer was referring to
a small group of books, mostly written by women, and dealing
with such issues as child care, divorce reform, spousal battery,
and menopause. 9
In any literal sense, the reviewer was wildly inaccurate. Every
year tens of thousands of books are published, a considerable
majority of them dealing with subjects such as war, sports, me-
chamcs, and power politics predominantly of interest to men. To
the reviewer, however, these did not seem like men's books, but
just books. The current distribution, in other words, seemed fair
and equal; the small group of new books about women unbal-
anced the publishing world. With minority hiring, according to
Derrick Bell, much the same happens."0 We think this percep-
tion is common. The reformer seems to be seeking special
treatment, asking for a departure from a situation we have come
to regard as neutral and fair. We fail to notice how the current
situation itself reflects a particular distribution of power and
authority, arrived at long ago. But we do notice changes and
proposals for change. These stand out starkly, seem like depar-
tures, and reqmre justification.
2. The Rule and the Exceptwn-What's So Special About
You?"
In a related mechamsm, we view outsiders as seeking an ex-
emption from umversal rules that all of us must obey For exam-
ple, in Employment Dizsin v. Smith"' (the peyote case), the
Supreme Court portrayed the small group of Indians in Oregon
128. See Jack Kisling, No Uh Men Need Apply, DENVER POST, May 4,
1993, at 9B (lamenting that most advice columnists and writers of self-help books
are women); see also Christina H. Sommers, Sister Soldiers: Live from a Women's
Studies Conference, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 1992, at 29 (decrying excessive attention
to feminist works of peripheral value to the exclusion of "great books of humanity in
general").
129. See Kisling, supra note 128, at B9.
130. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 9, at 142-44, 152-53 (com-
menting on the "tipping point" phenomenon in umversity faculty hiring).
131. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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as requesting to be excused from a uniform criminal law 132
Demands associated with multiculturalism often trigger the
same response-why should we excuse the new writers and cur-
ncula from the same test of time we apply to Shakespeare, Mil-
ton, and Mark Twain? 3'
Our preference for rules over ad hoc treatment gives this ar-
gument some imtial plausibility The difficulty is that there are
rules and rules. For example, one could argue in the Smith case
that the applicable rule is toleration for diverse cultures.'
Then, Oregon's law would be seen as an exception, as an impo-
sition on the Indians. Everything thus depends on the choice of
rule that one declares central: the criminal prohibition, accord-
ing to which taking mild drugs is illegal, or the principle of tol-
erance according to which Oregon was overstepping, imposing on
the Indians who were merely trying to practice their religion.
Recall also Justice Brown's approach in Plessy v
Ferguson,' in which he found blacks guilty of imposing on
other travellers by demanding to sit in the same railroad cars as
whites." 6 Viewed in that light, the Negroes were imposing on
the whites' customary rule-separate but equal. Of course, if one
declared that the relevant norm was the contrary one, the one
that the Supreme Court adopted in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tlont---namely, that citizens are entitled to public services re-
gardless of color-then the railroad imposed on the blacks.
3. "If You Give Them an Inch "
As we have seen, many deployments of the imposition figure
rest on a fear of the floodgates. 3 ' Because the first request
132. See id. at 878-82, 888-89.
133. See, e.g., ALAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HoW HIGHER
EDUCATION HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S STU-
DENTS (1987) (decrying the attack on the canon of great books and their replacement
by untested new entries); D'SOUZA, supra note 105, at 2-23, 55-68, 157-67, 173-93
(discussing the recent emphasis on racial and cultural diversity in faculty and curric-
ula).
134. See generally Delgado, supra note 106, at 343-48 (offering a similar analysis of
the campus hate-speech controversy).
135. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
136. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 538-51.
137. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
138. See supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text (giving examples of this ap-
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strikes us as extreme, the possibility of others raises real fears.
Giving in could set a precedent, start us down a path at the end
of which is a world we might not even recogmze. This in turn
taps a related narrative-fear of the unfamiliar, fear of loss of
control.
4. Fear of Loss of Control-"I Know What They Really Want"
All of us derive part of our self-definition from the wider soci-
ety .. Thus, on some level we understand that radical changes
in our surroundings could change us as persons. 40 Changes in
our city government, the curriculum or teachers in our children's
schools, or the composition of our neighborhood could require us
to adjust, to become different. In time our very identities might
change-a prospect that of course discomfits. Anyone who makes
this fear seem plausible commands our instant attention.
5. The Reformer as Ingrate-After All We Have Done for
Them"
Part of our identity is an image of ourselves as a tolerant and
generous society Reformers, however, suggest that we have not
lived up to our national ideals-that all men are not brothers,
all immigrants are not welcome, and so on. This assertion can-
not be true; the reformer must be wrong for even having raised
the idea. The impositiomst trope neatly enables us to accomplish
both objectives. We get to reaffirm that society is as we think,
and that the outsider has transgressed by suggesting that the
contrary may be true.
proach); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, a black
man was convicted for the murder of a white police officer. He challenged the Geor-
gia capital punishment system on equal protection grounds, claiming that imposition
of the death sentence was statistically related to the race of the victim and the de-
fendant. Id. at 286-87. The Court rejected McCleskey's claim and observed that
"there is no limiting principle to the type of challenge brought by McCleskey." Id. at
318.
139. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 23, at 1277-82.
140. See id. at 1280-82; Frederick R. Lynch, Surviving Affirmative Action (More or
Less), COMMENTARY, Aug. 1990, at 45 (deploring displacement of mainstream persons
by "certified minorities").
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6. The Usual and the Aberrant-"They're Standing the World
on Its Head"
Most of us believe that the United States is a relatively fair,
just society, one that offers opportunities to all. We prefer to
think of racism, sexism, and homophobia as exceptions, occasion-
al mistakes that with diligence can be reduced, if not eliminated
entirely 141 Reformers, however, often seem to be saying the
opposite-that injustice is the norm and fairness the exception.
This view seems to us to turn the world on its head, to insist
that night is day, and day night.
7 Evasin of Responsibility, the Role of Denial-"It's Not My
Fault"
Avoidance of blame and responsibility are umversal human
tendencies. No one likes to believe that he or she may be respon-
sible for serious continuing injustice. Yet the outsider seems
to be saying just that. Declaring him misguided or an opportun-
ist eliminates any need for soul-searching or admssion of error.
8. The Ordinary and the Extraordinary-"I Have Problems
Too"
The reformer's plea demands attention and possibly realloca-
tion of resources. But everyone has problems. What about
mine?"' If we can characterize the outsider group's complaints
as unexceptionable and ordinary, any urgency in addressing
them of course dissipates. One may even discover that one's own
problems are more interesting, more gripping, more subtle than
141. On this interplay between racism as the exceptional or the ordinary, see, for
example, Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1389 (1991) (reviewing ROY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM
(1990)) (advocating critical analysis to help explain the persistence of racial problems
in America).
142. See generally Shelby Steele, I'm Black, You're White, Who's Innocent?: Race
and Power in an Era of Blame, HARPER'S, June 1988, at 45 (characterizing the ra-
cial struggle in America as a contest for innocence).
143. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race:
The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-Isms),
1991 DUKE L.J. 397 (discussing the necessity and the tension of using analogies
comparing other oppressions to racism).
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those of the outsider group. The outsider group is imposing,
monopolizing attention that we deserve as well.
44
B. The Metaphor's Seeming Legitimacy: Its Manifest Content
and Why It Rings True
As we have shown, courts and other articulators of cultural
wisdom find the imposition narrative natural and attractive.
They deploy it freely, enthusiastically, unapologetically, and
often with considerable effect. 145 We also have shown how the
metaphor taps a variety of existing subnarratives ranging from
"I know what they really want," to "no special treatment," to
denial of responsibility 146 A final question, which we must ad-
dress briefly before turning to countervailing strategies, con-
cerns the metaphor's manifest righteousness. A narrative might
be powerful, but unattractive on its face for some reason-for
example, white supremacy, or the idea that men should be
women's protectors. In short, a rhetorical device must appear
right and true, must enable the speaker to use it and still main-
tain his or her self-image as a moral actor.
The imposition narrative performs these tasks admirably
First, we typically apply it only to a group that bears a preexist-
ing stigma.47 When such a group mobilizes to make demands
on us, it is easy to attach a further element to its stereotype:
now, in addition to being shiftless, hapless, immoral, and so
forth, it is overstepping and pushy The new element seems to
stand in a logical relation to the ones we have already assigned
it. The attachment causes few qualms; indeed, it seems self-evi-
dently correct. The group's demanding nature in itself verifies
the accusation and shows that what we think of them is true.
Characterizing the outsider group as imposing also justifies
our rejection of their claim. We seize the moral high ground.
They are the ones metaphorically throwing the first blow As
144. See id. (describing conversational gambit in which the speaker likens his own
experience-e.g., being excluded from a little league baseball team because of short
stature-to racism, in order to refocus the conversation on his experience and situa-
tion).
145. See supra part III.
146. See supra part IV.A.
147. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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victims, we are entitled not only to deny their demands, but to
tell the world how unfair and unprincipled they are. Many writ-
ers who employ imposition language do so with a kind of relish
and zeal. 8 They expect no rebuttal, for none is possible. In-
deed, the background against which they deliver their message
assures them that the rest of us will nod assent. Of course, that
group is overstepping. That is what they do.
V REFORM: NATURAL HISTORY AND LESSONS FOR ITS
PROPONENTS
A. How Our Society Treats Most Reform Movements
Underlying many uses of the imposition metaphor is
nonreflexivity, the quite natural tendency to believe that one's
own way of seeing and doing things is natural and umversal.
The nonreflexive person-which includes most of us on many
occasions-on hearing his or her most settled beliefs impugned
by an outsider immediately tinnks that the outsider must be
wrong. By a kind of backward reasoning we conclude that be-
cause the individual is questioning that which we believe, he or
she must be wrong and probably operating from base motives as
well.
The natural path of most reform movements, then, takes
something like the following form. At early stages, the culture
responds generously 149 We are curious, interested in the new
things the reformers are saying. We invite them to our homes,
read their books, discuss their theories and ideas. Behaving in
this fashion reaffirms our self-image as an open, sharing people.
Little seems to be at stake, indeed, our lives appear to be en-
riched by the reform movement-there is a new piquancy at
parties, some welcome variety to talk in the faculty lounge.150
Later, the reality of what the reformers are asking for starts
to sink in. Our attitudes change. We begin to wonder whether
148. See, e.g., supra notes 1-3, 33-36, 40-46, 55-60, 64-65, 72-86, 105, 112-27 and
accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (describing society's initial support
for and identification with reform movements).
150. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. See also TOM WOLFE, RADICAL
CHIC & MAU-MAUING THE FLAK CATCHERS (1970).
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the reformers actually can be asking for that. We question the
reformers' factual predicate or description of the world as con-
taimng much injustice. We ask is there not another possible ac-
count? Could not the lack of blacks in the construction industry
be due to some reason other than discrimination? 5' We ques-
tion the necessity or plausibility of their story Or, we shrink
from the substance of their demands, retreating into
proceduralism. We profess not to understand their claim, or ask
questions demanding greater specificity- Where would you draw
the line?'52 We wonder about implications and floodgates. If we
heeded your request, what other things would we have to do?
What would you be asking for next?5 . All of these responses
share something with the common-law device of the demurrer.
Even if, for the sake of argument, what you say is true, what fol-
lows?154
At this stage of incipient demal, we also question the remedy
the reformers request. In our view, racism or other injustices are
aberrations, hence any remedy would naturally have to be short-
lived and bounded. But this group's proposed reform appears to
go on forever-how can that be?.55 We express concern, ask for
clarification, pretend not fully to understand what the outsiders
are demanding.
Each of these replies is a kind of shrinking from substance, an
instance of canon-fear, a fear of the earth shifting, of what might
happen if it turns out that structural change in fact is in order.
Notice the metaphors of earth movement or washing away- "pa-
rade of horribles," "flood of litigation," "drawing the line," "open-
151. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-06, 728 (1989)
(holding the city's minority set-aside ordinance for construction contracts invalid be-
cause of lack of sufficient evidence of racial discrimination in contracting); Fullilove
v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448, 530 n. 12 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that it
is too simple to "assume that every single Negro, Spanish-speaking citizen, Oriental,
Indian, Eskumo, and Aleut potentially interested in construction contracting currently
suffers from the effects of past or present racial discrimination").
152. See supra notes 82-84, 107-27 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 94-99, 107-27, 138-40 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.22, at 295 (2d
ed. 1993) (explaining the use of demurrer to test a claim's validity under existing
doctrine).
155. E.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (expressing concern that the proposed remedies
to racial discrimination would be "limitless in scope and duration").
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ing the floodgates," 5 ' and so on. Notice also the parallels to
another procedural device by which the law eliminates irritating
claims: misjoinder of parties.'57 The Court in Croson said in ef-
fect, "Another minority might come along and make the same
claim-say an Aleut, or an Eskimo, or an Alsatian-and then
what would happen?" and so dismissed the case.'58 Something
similar happened in McCleskey v. Kemp,'59 which dismissed a
death penalty challenge based on statistical evidence because
this approach could lead to "too much justice."60
At later stages, of course, we put procedure behind us. We tell
the reformer, "all right, we will reach the merits of your claim.
We understand full well what you are saying, its implications,
whom it will affect, who has standing. And, we find your claim
illegitimate, unprincipled, and wrong." In the last decade or so,
we seem to have reached such a decisive end point with
blacks.16' The imposition narratives we apply to them have lost
the tentative, nibbling-at-the-edges quality we apply to groups
that have merely begun to tax our patience. We now apply to
them, practically alone, the most scathing forms of rejec-
tion-reection on the merits, rejection that finds their claims,
their very presence as persons, imposition-in-itself. One final
task, before we turn to the question of responses, is to account
for this special treatment.
B. The Special Situatin of American Blacks
Throughout most of its history, the United States' formal val-
ues-its central federal ones-have been higher, more inclusive,
156. See supra notes 94-100, 107-27 and accompanying text.
157. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 154, at 334-35 (discussing joinder and ns-
joinder of claims).
158. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06; accord Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) (stating that if the mentally retarded were granted qua-
si-suspect status it could lead to similar status for other groups such as "the aging,
the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm").
159. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
160. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315-17 (raising the fear that statistical challenges
could produce claims based on unexplained discrepancies in group treatment in
many different kinds of cases).
161. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, supra note- 9 (asserting that
racism against blacks is particularly virulent, probably ineradicable); infra part V.B.
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more aspirational, more nonracist and nonsexist, than the pri-
vate ones, the ones we act on during moments of intimacy, when
among friends, in our club, in a neighborhood bar or cafe.162 On
these other occasions, many Americans feel freer, more inclined
to tell a racist joke, or exclude a black from a small gathering.
More Americans feel entitled to select a white tenant than an
equally qualified black for an in-law apartment in their own
home than would vote to permit similar behavior on the part of
a governmental housing authority 163 In recognition of this,
most grass roots civil rights efforts have focused on formal, cen-
tral structures-law, federal government, large institu-
tions-because these are the ones most receptive to change, the
ones whose formal values are the more egalitarian national
ones. " At these levels, it is possible to remind one's target of
the values to which our society formally is committed, and hope
that the structure will change.
Significantly, one would not employ that strategy in a society
where the opposite situation prevails, South Africa for example,
where the national values are less egalitarian than the private
ones.'65 In that other kind of place, one is best off seeing suc-
cor from a private individual. If one is black and ill, out of mon-
ey, or has a car breakdown during a long road trip, one is far
more likely to find kindness at the hands of a private citizen,
not a government agency or the police. Until recently, much the
same was true in the American South.'66
We believe that the United States is in the process of chang-
ing imperceptibly, so that it is becoming more like South Africa.
162. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Preju-
dice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1383-86.
163. Id. at 1386; see also WILSON, RANK ORDER OF DISCRIMINATION AND ITS RELE-
VANCE TO CIVIL RIGHTS PRIORITIES 216 (J. Brigham & T. Weissbach eds., 1972).
164. Delgado et al., supra note 162, at 1383; JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE:
AMERICA's CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS; 1954-1965 (1987) (detailing the campaign to change
national civil rights policy at the congressional and Supreme Court level). But see
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORI-
TIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993) (deploring this tendency).
165. Until recently, South Africa was committed formally to a policy of apartheid,
or formal separation of the races. See THE ANTI-APARTHEID READER: SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST WHITE RACIST RULE (David Mermelstein ed., 1987).
166. See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (20th Anmversary ed. 1962).
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Today, for the first time in half a century, large groups of people
(e.g., the State of Colorado) behave according to a lower stan-
dard than do individuals or small cities (e.g., Boulder, Aspen, or
Denver)."' By the same token, the national government and
Supreme Court are becoming less receptive to minority concerns
than their state or local counterparts. In a remarkable reversal,
the majority in Croson recognized tins development, took note of
it, and re-seized control away from local authority that wanted
to institute favorable measures for blacks. 6 ' The Court told
the city council in no uncertain terms that the Federal Constitu-
tion forbade what they were trying to do, and insisted that they
abide by formality and a regime under winch blacks had been
excluded from city contracts.'69 Richmond's own interpretation
of its regional instory, customs, and culture, winch dictated a
remedy for the lack of black contractors and builders, was over-
ridden in favor of a sterile neutralism. Never mind local kind-
ness-be formal and neutralist, the Supreme Court insisted.
Follow the old rules and criteria under winch few minority sub-
contractors won awards.
There is, thus, a type of double axis. In all times and ages
minority reformers face resistance, pretended incomprehension,
and hostility at predictable points. And, at certain points in
Instory, society is especially resistant to reform of any sort, be-
cause its formal values are beginning to move in another direc-
tion. With resistance of both types, imposition language serves
as a prime mediating mechanism, portraying the reformer as
extreme and irresponsible, portraying localism, love, and sym-
pathy as out of order, wrong, subordinate to universalistic
meritocratic, neutralist rules that assure the ascendancy of man-
agerial whites. Imposition language reminds all concerned that
167. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b) (1992). Commonly referred to as "Amend-
ment Two," adopted by referendum, this new state constitutional provision prohibits
local authorities from enacting antidiscrimination measures for gays and lesbians.
Enforcement of the amendment is currently enjoined pending a state trial on the
amendment's validity. See Dirk Johnson, Trial Is Set on Colorado Laws Against Gay
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993, at A21.
168. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504-11; see Ross, The Richmond Narratives, supra
note 12, at 394-95.
169. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504-07.
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the center holds power and authority, dictates rules, controls
results-and under those rules the reformer is out of line, is
imposing, is wrong. How dare he?
C. What a Reformer Can Do
The issue arises, then, what can a reform movement do when
it finds that imposition language is being used against it? Ulti-
mately, we fear, very little. Society deploys the imposition meta-
phor only at a point when a broad consensus is fornng that
reform is going too far. The reformers are no longer in favor; we
have decided that they are taxing our patience, imposing on our
good natures. The point of designating someone guilty of imposi-
tion is to declare that no excuses are possible. From this point
forward we need not listen to what he or she has to say- we
have heard enough.
Nevertheless, there are a few measures that reformers can
take, including simply naming and calling attention to the strat-
egy being deployed against them.70 One can also question the
premise underlying the charge of imposition. Is not the status
quo itself unfair, an imposition, an affront to minorities? Does it
not reflect a centuries-old distribution of resources and power
that should be open to question? 7'
Outsiders can counterdeploy the metaphor of the bully to de-
pict their critics as unsympathetic and overbearing." In our
culture one is supposed to be generous 'to underdogs. One who
unreasonably or too early declares them non grata runs the risk
of being seen as uncharitable. Another approach, cultural na-
tionalism, is sometimes available. 3 This strategy ignores the
170. On the value of simply naming the evil that confronts one, see, for example,
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law Reform,
Critical Librananship and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 221 n.90
(1989) (stating that many societal problems, such as battering, are not dealt with
until they are named).
171. On this strategy, see Delgado, supra note 16 (asserting that legal disputes on
issues from cigarette warnings to date rape reflect an underlying struggle for cultur-
al power, most often won by the dominant, stronger force).
172. We say "counterdeploy" because the imposition narrative paints them as the
aggressor. See supra notes 4-7, 23-127, 138-40, 123-24, 160-61 and accompanying
text.
173. On cultural nationalism and separation from the majority, see, for example,
19941 1057
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1025
way mainstream writers characterize one's movement, focusing
instead on strengthemng the group's own sense of itself and its
own institutions. The hope is that by strategic retreat the group
will avoid expending energy in nonproductive struggles over its
own identity and legitimacy
A final strategy is the preemptive strike. As soon as one notic-
es that opinion is changing, seize the initiative. Write a book
like Martin Luther King's Why We Can't Wait." Explain why
the movement is not imposing, but has been long suffering and
patient. As we mentioned, we are skeptical that measures like
these will provide more than temporary benefit. Society has a
built-in homeostat: the status quo appears natural, reform un-
natural. The burden is always on the reformer. And when he or
she tries to shoulder that burden the reformer finds that all the
presumptions, all the prevailing narratives and expectations, cut
the other way 1.5
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have shown that the mechamsm of impos-
tion plays a central role in resisting reform. It enables us to
paint reformers as grasping and unprincipled just when their
movements begin to gain ground and change our world. Before
that point, we are generous and welcoming. We empathize with
the underdog, the person who champions the cause of the poor
or oppressed. But at a certain point, our attitude changes. We
begin to see the outsiders as overstepping, as asking for more
than they deserve, as imposing on our good natures and generos-
ity
Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, supra note 21; Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990
DUKE L.J. 758.
174. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1964).
175. See Delgado, supra note 16 (discussing the difficulty a reformer has m oppos-
ing the status quo tendency of courts and legislators); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw,
Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (characterizing the civil rights movement
as a radical challenge to the "dominant order" of a white, racist hegemony); Alan D.
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (summariz-
ing Supreme Court decisions on antidiscrimination laws as merely legitimizing the
existing social structure, race relations, and class system).
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It is turnaround time. Now they are victimizing us, they the
ones who are imposing, we the ones who deserve sympathy and
consideration. We illustrated the operation of the imposition
mechamsm by means of examples drawn from different reform
movements appearing at different times in history We showed
the principal forms the imposition-narrative takes, and how it
plays a role in Supreme Court rhetoric and ordinary language.
We showed how it derives its efficacy from a family of
subnarratives and stones, all of which combine to deprive the
reformer of moral legitimacy at the same time that they enable
the rest of us to feel comfortable about withdrawing support.
We analyzed countermeasures reformers can take when they
find imposition language used against them, including separat-
ism, turnabout, and the preemptive strike. None of these mea-
sures is likely to be fully effective, we concluded, because of our
nature as situated actors. Our social situation is always, at some
level, continuous with our selves. It seems natural, forms part of
the baseline from which we reason. The current regime will al-
ways strike us as legitimate and justified. Reformers who are
trying to restructure that regime radically invariably strike us
as dangerous and extreme.
The paradox of reform is that we seem doomed to resist it
until it essentially is too late-until it has already taken place
or has lost its power to transform us.
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